The use of AI in healthcare is designed to improve care delivery and augment the decisions of providers to enhance patient outcomes. When deployed in clinical settings, the interaction between providers and AI is a critical component for measuring and understanding the effectiveness of these digital tools on broader health outcomes. Even in cases where AI algorithms have high diagnostic accuracy, healthcare providers often still rely on their experience and sometimes gut feeling to make a final decision. Other times, providers rely unquestioningly on the outputs of the AI models, which leads to a concern about over-reliance on the technology. The purpose of this research was to understand how reliant drug shop dispensers were on AI-powered technologies when determining a differential diagnosis for a presented clinical case vignette. We explored how the drug dispensers responded to technology that is framed as always correct in an attempt to measure whether they begin to rely on it without any critical thought of their own. We found that dispensers relied on the decision made by the AI 25 percent of the time, even when the AI provided no explanation for its decision.

Illegal extraction of forest resources is fought, in many developing countries, by patrols that try to make this activity less profitable, using the threat of confiscation. With a limited budget, officials will try to distribute the patrols throughout the forest intelligently, in order to most effectively limit extraction. Prior work in forest economics has formalized this as a Stackelberg game, one very different in character from the discrete Stackelberg problem settings previously studied in the multiagent literature. Specifically, the leader wishes to minimize the distance by which a profit-maximizing extractor will trespass into the forest---or to maximize the radius of the remaining ``pristine'' forest area. The follower's cost-benefit analysis of potential trespass distances is affected by the likelihood of being caught and suffering confiscation. In this paper, we give a near-optimal patrol allocation algorithm and a 1/2-approximation algorithm, the latter of which is more efficient and yields simpler, more practical patrol allocations. Our simulations indicate that these algorithms substantially outperform existing heuristic allocations.

Illegal extraction of forest resources is fought, in many developing countries, by patrols through the forest that seek to deter such activity by decreasing its profitability. With limited resources for performing such patrols, a patrol strategy will seek to distribute the patrols throughout the forest, in space and time, in order to minimize the resulting amount of extraction that occurs or maximize the degree of forest protection, according to one of several potential metrics. We pose this problem as a Stackelberg game. We adopt and extend the simple, geometrically elegant model of (Albers 2010). First, we study optimal allocations of patrol density under generalizations of this model, relaxing several of its assumptions. Second, we pose the problem of generating actual schedules whose site visit frequencies are consistent with the analytically computed optimal patrol densities.